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Abstract 
In the lead-up to the creation of a Eurasian Economic Union in 2015, the Customs Union and 
the Common Economic Space between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan represent two 
elements of the most ambitious regional integration project launched in the post-Soviet era 
since 1991. This CEPS Special Report examines both the potential and the limits of Eurasian 
economic integration. For the purpose of assessing the Eurasian integration process, CEPS 
applied a modified version of a framework first developed by Ernest B. Haas and Philippe C. 
Schmitter in 1964 to project whether economic integration of a group of countries 
automatically engenders political unity. Taking the data available for the early stages of the 
European integration process as a benchmark, the results for the Customs Union and the 
Common Economic Space point to a rather unfavourable outlook for Eurasian economic 
integration.  
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Executive summary 
bservers of the post-Soviet space have seen reintegration efforts proliferate among 
different constellations of countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States. This has resulted in the creation of several structures with partly overlapping 
memberships, different integration objectives and varying modes of governance. The 
Collective Security Treaty Organization, the GUAM Organization for Democracy and 
Economic Development and the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation are cases 
in point. These arrangements have provided platforms for continuous interaction and 
socialisation among countries. However, both the speed and the level of integration within 
these structures vary greatly and none of the arrangements has reached the levels of 
integration attained within the EU. 
In the lead-up to the creation of a Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), foreseen for 2015, the 
Customs Union (CU) and the Common Economic Space (CES) between Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan represent two elements of the most ambitious regional integration project 
launched in the post-Soviet space since 1991. An initiative conceptualised by President 
Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan in 1994, the institutionalisation of the EEU has gained 
momentum since Vladimir Putin promoted it in the newspaper Izvestia on 4 October 2011. 
Reactions of policy-makers and analysts have ranged from describing the plan as a 
pipedream to the next real thing. 
Leaving politics aside, how can one assess whether or not the Eurasian integration effort is 
economically viable? The best way forward is to select practical indicators to analyse the 
existing Customs Union and CES, so as to glean insights into the levels of economic 
integration and project them onto the model of the future EEU. In this regard, an adapted 
version of the framework conceptualised by Haas and Schmitter in 1964, which has been 
applied to assess the early stages of the European integration process, is a helpful tool. 
The indicators outlined in the adapted model are classified in three groups i) background 
conditions, ii) formation conditions and iii) process conditions of economic integration 
models. The background conditions include the size of units (e.g. population, GDP), distance 
between economic centres and initial rates of transaction (i.e. share of regional exports in 
overall foreign trade). The formation conditions assess the implementation of common 
policies and the power of supranational institutions in these policy areas. The process 
conditions evaluate the change likely to be brought about by the functioning of the 
integration structures in terms of the governance mode and the economic effects attained. 
When testing these indicators, the relative size of the units and the distance between 
economic centres present tougher background conditions for Eurasian economic integration 
than those experienced during the earlier years of the European integration process. The 
analysis of the current rates of transaction between the members of the future EEU also 
shows an imbalanced pattern of regional trade integration. Coupled with rather slow 
dynamics for the movement of capital and labour force, this starting-point makes the 
creation of a fully-fledged economic union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan more 
challenging than the one undertaken by the six founding states of the European Economic 
Community. 
The analysis of the implementation of the powers attributed to the supranational institutions 
of the future EEU in designated common policy areas shows less then favourable process 
conditions for the EEU. The Eurasian Economic Commission’s competences and the EurAsEc 
O
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Court’s jurisdiction are rather limited in comparison to those which allowed the European 
Commission and the Court of Justice to build a strong law-based community. The 
governance mode in the current Customs Union and CES is predominantly 
intergovernmental. Moreover, the outcome-based transactions that were largely positive for 
the European integration process (investment flows, migration changes, dynamics of intra-
union trade volumes in the most important sectors) are ambiguous for the EEU, and unlikely 
to change much in light of the preceding considerations.  
In sum, when applying the model to the current Customs Union and Common Economic 
Space between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, and when comparing the findings with the 
data available for the early stages of the European integration process, the conclusion points 
to a rather uncertain future for economic integration within the context of the EEU. 
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1. The Eurasian integration process: models and institutions 
The rapid proliferation of regional economic integration models in the latter half of the 20th 
century is often attributed to the success of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
established in 1957. 1  The substantial increase in intra-EEC trade in the 1960s inspired 
countries on other continents to set up regional organisations: ASEAN in South East Asia 
(1967), ECOWAS in West Africa (1975), MERCOSUR in Latin America (1991) and NAFTA in 
North America (1994), to name but a few. Integration within these groupings has been 
limited to free trade agreements, however, with the notable exception of MERCOSUR 
establishing its customs union in 1995.  
Over the last two decades we have also witnessed a proliferation of reintegration efforts 
among different constellations of countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS). This has given rise to the creation of several structures with partly overlapping 
memberships, different integration objectives and varying modes of governance. The 
Collective Security Treaty Organization, the GUAM Organization for Democracy and 
Economic Development, and the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (with a 
membership extending into southeast Europe) are cases in point.2 These arrangements have 
provided platforms for continuous interaction and socialisation among countries in the post-
Soviet space. Both the speed and the level of integration within these structures vary greatly. 
None of these arrangements has reached levels of integration attained within the European 
Union (EU), which operates by way of both supranational and intergovernmental 
governance modes. 
The focus of this CEPS Special Report are the Customs Union (CU) and the Common 
Economic Space (CES) between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which represent two 
elements of one the most ambitious regional integration projects launched in the post-Soviet 
space since 1991: the creation of a Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) foreseen for 2015. An 
initiative conceptualised by the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev in his 
speech at Moscow’s State University in March 1994, the institutionalisation of the Eurasian 
Economic Union has gained momentum since the publication of an article by President, then 
Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin in the newspaper Izvestia on 4 October 2011.3  
The first step towards the creation of the EEU was the establishment in 2010 of the Customs 
Union, which encompasses a common customs territory and legislation (the Customs Code, 
with effect from 1 July 2010), a single commodity nomenclature of foreign economic activity, 
common customs tariff and non-tariff regulation measures, as well as common procedures 
                                                     
1 See, for instance, Mattli (1999) and Schiff & Winters (2003). 
2 See Libman and Vinokurov (2012). 
3  This was followed by similar publications by the President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenka 
(Izvestia, 17 October 2011) and the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev (Izvestia, 25 October 
2011). 
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for customs clearance and control. The Treaty on the Commission of the CU (6 October 2007) 
established a supranational body composed of one member from each state at the level of 
deputy head of government. The votes in the Commission were distributed as follows: 
Belarus – 21.5%; Kazakhstan – 21.5%; Russian Federation – 57%. The Commission of the CU 
includes the Committee for Regulation of Foreign Trade Issues, composed of two 
representatives from each member state. The member states also dispatched at least five 
specialists to the Council of Experts. The Secretariat provides informational and technical 
support to the CU Commission itself and the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, which 
meets at the level of heads of state or government. The Secretariat is composed of the 
Executive Secretary and one deputy from each of the member states. Its seat is in Moscow. 
The ratification of the Action Plan for the establishment of the Common Economic Space in 
December 2010 marked the second phase of the Eurasian integration process. The CES, 
which kicked off in January 2012, aims to ensure the effective functioning of the common 
market for goods, services, capital and labour, and to establish coherent industrial, transport, 
energy and agricultural policies. The CES envisions further regulatory convergence and 
harmonisation of national laws in the areas established by the agreements that constitute the 
legal framework of the CES. The development and implementation of a coherent economic 
policy; transition to the harmonisation of the main macroeconomic indicators of the member 
states; deepening of monetary cooperation; collaboration on migration policy and ensuring 
interoperability of standards of education are also an integral part of the CES. The project 
also foresees cooperation between parliaments, business communities and people, including 
in the sphere of culture, the formation of effective patterns of inter-regional and cross-border 
collaboration, and the development of cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy. 
2. Aim of the study and methodological justification 
This study will analyse the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and the 
Common Economic Space, paying particular attention to the scope of the Eurasian Economic 
Commission’s activity, the (expected) levels and impact of economic integration, and the 
external dimension of these models of integration. These findings will be contrasted with a 
review of the early stages of the European economic integration process, its objectives, 
structures, instruments, levels and effects of integration. The study will then turn to the 
initiative of establishing the Eurasian Economic Union and will examine the envisaged 
objectives, membership and governance modes of the organisation. Finally, the analysis will 
be geared towards answering the key question: what lessons can the actors in the Eurasian 
integration process learn from the lessons already learned from the European integration 
process? As such, this CEPS Special Report does not dwell on areas already covered by other, 
excellent studies: the politics driving the Eurasian economic integration process and the legal 
and political dilemmas for countries which have been offered a membership perspective.4 
For our research purposes, we use the following broad definition of a regional integration 
agreement: an agreement between two or more independent states to remove tariffs on intra-
bloc trade, as well as to eliminate non-tariff barriers, liberalise investment and coordinate 
other policies. 5  The deepest form of such integration is an economic union, which 
necessitates the creation of shared institutions. The study distinguishes between three major 
levels of economic integration: 
                                                     
4 See, e.g., Shumylo-Tapiola (2012), resp. Van der Loo & Van Elsuwege (2012). 
5 Based on the characteristics identified by Schiff & Winters (2003), World Bank. 
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1) free trade agreements (FTAs): eliminate customs tariffs on intra-bloc trade without 
imposing an external tariff for external trade; 
2) customs union: removes tariffs on intra-bloc trade and imposes a common external 
tariff for external trade; 
3) economic union: eliminates non-tariff barriers and converges major economic policies 
to establish a common market.  
The opportunities and challenges of transition from the current Customs Union to a fully-
fledged economic union within the Eurasian integration process are the focal point of our 
analysis. Going by the current levels of economic integration in the framework of the CU and 
CES, a comparison will be made with early integration efforts in the context of the European 
Economic Community (EEC). 
In order to compare the levels and dynamics of economic integration in the CU/CES and the 
EEC, the study uses a mix of data derived from official documents, academic and policy-
oriented sources. Two caveats are in order. Firstly, the case studies have different empirical 
bases. The EEC had been in place for over three decades before the European Union was 
created. Conversely, the establishment of the Customs Union and the Common Economic 
Space is a recent development with less empirical data available from reliable sources. 
Secondly, the setting up of the Eurasian Economic Union is a work in progress. We can 
therefore only draw conclusions by extrapolating and comparing data. The proposed 
methodology will take these evident limitations into account. 
The choice for an analytical framework is informed by two other important considerations. 
First, it should offer viable indicators for comparing the regional integration models of the 
CU/CES/EEU and the EEC/EU, while bridging their different historical trajectories and 
internal characteristics. Secondly, it should provide a tool for analysing the integration 
models as dynamic processes rather than offering a snapshot at a particular point in time. 
It is for these reasons that we have adopted the analytical framework developed by Haas & 
Schmitter in their seminal article of 1964. This framework will allow us to analyse the early 
stages of European integration and compare its major elements to the peculiarities of the 
Eurasian integration process. The added value of this framework is that it combines different 
variables, in particular structural economic conditions and modes of governance, which 
appear crucial in the analysis of the nascent Eurasian Economic Union. Such an approach has 
been supported by more recent research in the field of integration studies. For instance, 
Badinger (2001) also suggests that the measurement of economic integration should draw on 
the “elements of positive integration”, such as the creation of common institutions. 
Drawing on the methodological insights offered by Haas & Schmitter, we will divide the 
indicators of integration into three groups: background conditions, formation conditions and 
process conditions, each depending on the stage of economic integration. 
1. Background conditions for economic integration models aim to identify and compare 
the starting points of the integration processes, i.e. the baselines before functioning 
customs unions are launched: the European Economic Community in 1957 and the 
Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in 2010. The background conditions 
include the size of units, distance between economic centres and initial rates of 
transaction.6 This part of the analysis mainly involves quantitative methods. 
                                                     
6  The latter indicators somewhat overlap with the “market-integration” indicators suggested by 
Vinokurov (2010) to analyse the Eurasian integration process, such as trade integration and labour 
migration. Such indicators are included in the broader category of indicators termed “rates of 
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2. Formation conditions scrutinise the principles and methods by which the economic 
integration model is managed, as they influence the efficiency of the operation. Given 
the governance mode enshrined in the current treaties, we focus on two major 
indicators: the implementation of common policies and the powers of supranational 
institutions in these policy areas. This part of the analysis relies on qualitative methods. 
3. Process conditions evaluate the changes likely to be brought about by the functioning 
of the integration structures, in terms of the governance mode and the economic effects 
attained. Conclusions about the governance mode can be drawn from a comparison of 
the national and supranational competences in the decision-making process. The 
expected economic effects of integration are outlined by comparing the empirical data 
on the EEC integration effects with changes in the trade patterns spurred by the early 
stage of the Eurasian integration. Hence, this part of the analysis will use both 
qualitative and quantitative methods. 
These groups of indicators inform the structure of Section 3 of this report. Section 3.1 outlines 
the background conditions to evaluate how complementary the economies of the envisaged 
Union are before the introduction of the Customs Union as a first stage of integration. 
Section 3.2 assesses the progress in implementing common policies, focusing on the common 
tariff policy, and questions the adequacy and the role of the newly established supranational 
institutions in the next stages of the integration process. Section 3.3 summarises the 
institutional changes underpinning governance in the Customs Union and analyses the 
instant economic effects unleashed by the integration efforts over the last two years. Finally, 
Section 3.4 concludes by highlighting the challenges identified in the process of the Eurasian 
integration and proposing tentative measures to overcome them. 
3. Comparing Eurasian and European economic integration 
3.1 Background conditions 
In order to estimate the viability of the envisaged economic union, we compare it with the 
early stages of the EEC according to the three background factors outlined in the literature 
review: i) relative size of constituting units; ii) distance between major economic centres; and 
iii) rates of transaction.  
3.1.1 Size of units 
The main factual data, provided in Table 1, lead us to conclude that the EEC (at the 
beginning of the integration process) and the CU/CES have comparable levels of total 
population size (167 million and 169 million respectively), even though their geographical 
areas differ drastically (the CU is about 17 times larger than the EEC was in 1957). The 
internal imbalances of populations and area size are obvious: while the EEC was composed 
of three comparatively large member states, two small member states and one microstate, the 
EEC comprises one very large member state (Russia), which accounts for over 84% of the 
total population and 85% of the total area, and two small member states, whose population 
and land mass are significantly smaller. By contrast, the share of the most populous member 
state, West Germany, was 32% of the total EEC population, reasonably balanced by the 
populations of France and Italy. Russia’s market size too is dominant in the CU/CES, again 
with a share of 84%. The disparity in volume between the economies is even more striking: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
transaction” in this research, because we aspire to make a clear distinction between the starting 
conditions of economic integration and the outcomes (which are dealt with in Section 3). 
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Russia’s GDP accounted for over 88% of the Customs Union’s GDP in 2009, while West 
Germany’s share barely exceeded 40% before the creation of the EEC. 
Table 1. Comparison of the basic characteristics of the two economic blocs 
Criteria EEC (as of 1957) EEU (2010) 
Members Federal Republic of 
Germany, Italy, France, 
Netherlands, Belgium, 
Luxembourg 
Russian Federation, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan 
Area size 1.17 mln sq km, including: 
‐ France: 547, 000 sq km 
‐ Italy: 301, 000 sq km 
‐ FRG: 248, 000 sq km 
‐ Benelux: 76, 657 sq km 
20 mln sq. km, including: 
‐ Russia: 17,1 mln sq km 
‐ Kazakhstan: 2,7 mln sq km 
‐ Belarus: 207,000 sq km 
Population (i.e. market size) Total: 167 mln7, including: 
‐ 3 big member states 
(FRG, Italy, France) 
‐ 3 small member states 
 168,9 mln, including:  
‐ Russia: 141,9 mln8 
‐ Kazakhstan: 16.4 mln9 
‐ Belarus: 9.5 mln10 
Population share of biggest MS  West  Germany11 - 32% Russia – 84%  
Share of the biggest member 
state in total GDP 
West  Germany – about 
40%12 
Russia – 88% 
 
We can thus conclude that the EEC demonstrated more homogeneity in terms of size of 
populations, territories and economies than the members of the CU, which are strongly 
dominated by Russia. This imbalance is likely to have implications for the distribution of 
power within the envisaged Eurasian Economic Union. 
As the experience of the EU has shown, the increase in the size of the market offers 
companies and consumers a number of advantages: most notably economies of scale, which 
lower costs for producers and can thus increase their competitiveness in foreign markets. 
However, this benefit is contingent on the success of eliminating non-tariff barriers in intra-
union trade. Secondly, the increase in intra-union competition is likely to benefit consumers, 
provided that the necessary competition laws are put in place by the supranational authority.  
Overall, the increase in market size may be deemed a favourable impetus to the development 
of economic unions. However, the adverse effects that result from the asymmetries in unit 
size should be negated by adequate competition policies and suitable governance structures. 
                                                     
7 Eurostat data cited in (http://www.ined.fr/fichier/t_telechargement/30959/ 
telechargement_fichier_fr_population.europe_27.pdf.) 
8 Data taken from Demographic Yearbook of Russia, 2010, Rosstat 
(http://www.gks.ru/doc_2010/demo.pdf, p.25). 
9 Kazakhstan Statistic Agency (http://www.stat.kz/digital/naselsenie/Pages/Archieve_2010.aspx 
(Kazakh)). 
10 National Statistic Committee of Belarus 
(http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/indicators/regions/1.php (Russian) 
11 West Germany’s population was 53.6 mln. Data quoted from Statistisches Jahrbuch der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, retrieved from (http://www.populstat.info/Europe/germanwc.htm). 
12 Data from Broadberry & Klein (2011), p. 22 
(http://www.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/1/1699/papers/Broadberry_Klein.pdf).  
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3.1.2 Distance between major economic centres  
According to the gravity model of international trade, the distance between economic centres 
of two states exerts significant influence on the dynamics of economic integration, as it 
impacts on the transportation costs between the participating countries.13 We operationalise 
this indicator as the shortest road distances between major trading centres, both in the EEC 
and the envisaged EEU (see Table 2).  
Table 2. Comparison of the distances between major economic centres in the EEC and the EAEU 
Trade flows Distance, km 
EEC  
Paris – Frankfurt 573 
Frankfurt – Amsterdam 438 
EEU  
Moscow – Minsk 717 
Moscow – Astana 2,700 
 
Given the distances between major economic centres, the transportation costs appear to be 
much higher in the case of trade within the CU than within the EEC. Besides, there is 
significant asymmetry in the distance between Russia’s and Belarus’ economic centres and 
those of Russia and Kazakhstan, which affects intra-bloc trade flows. This factor might 
significantly impede the envisaged positive effects of removing tariff barriers to trade and 
increasing labour mobility, and will therefore require greater efforts to ease cross-border 
trade, such as improving transport infrastructure. 
3.1.3 Rates of transaction 
Analysis of export structures helps us to understand whether the economies of the three 
member states exhibited a sufficient level of integration prior to the launch of the CU.  
As our analysis of trade data shows, most export volumes of the CU member states are 
shipped to third countries, not to each other. Russia, as the core economy of the Customs 
Union had lower rates of transactions with other CU members than those recorded between 
the founding states of the European Economic Community. For instance, the share of exports 
to the CIS in the total exports of goods from Russia did not exceed 16% in the run-up to the 
formation of the CU, as the data in Table 3 suggest. 
Table 3. Structure of Russia’s exports in 2006-2010 
Export, bln USD 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total 303.6 354.4 471.6 303.4 400.4 
to CIS countries 43.4 53.8 71.1 48.1 62.6 
to non-CIS countries 260.2 300.6 400.5 255.2 337.8 
Share of CIS 14% 15% 15% 16% 16% 
Sources: Russian State Statistical Service; the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. 
                                                     
13 See, for instance, Molle (1990), Frankel (1997). 
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Given the export structure by country provided in Table 3, Russia has been more reliant on 
foreign trade with third countries than with potential members of the CU, with the 
neighbouring CIS countries accounting for only 14-16% of total exports in 2006-2009. By 
comparison, the share of West German exports to other EEC-to-be members was 29.4% in 
1956,14 with the open economies of Belgium and the Netherlands even more dependent on 
intra-regional trade. Russia, as the core of the Customs Union, was therefore ex ante less 
integrated with its neighbours than the core countries of the EEC.  
Another major obstacle to further economic integration within the Eurasian grouping is the 
openness of its members’ economies to foreign trade. For instance, out of 125 countries listed, 
Russia was ranked as the 114th economy in the World Economic Forum’s 2010 Enabling 
Trade Index,15 while Kazakhstan’s higher ranking of 88 is still a far cry from the level of 
openness exhibited by the West European economies participating in regional integration 
schemes. If the envisaged EEU is to encompass other member states, then its predecessor’s 
current three members will need to improve their openness to trade. 
Further, it is necessary to take account of trade structures to understand the economic 
rationale behind the establishment of the CU. Russia’s trade structure is heavily reliant on 
the export of crude oil and oil products, natural gas and metals (see Figure 1), with 
manufactured products accounting for less than a quarter of total exports. However, the 
export share of the latter products was higher in trade with CIS countries, with machinery 
accounting for about 13%. We can thus assume that the need to increase the share of 
manufactured products in exports to diversify Russia’s economy was part of Moscow’s 
calculus to establish a Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
Figure 1. Trade structure of Russia’s total exports (left) and exports to CIS countries (right), 2009 
 
Sources: Russia's Statistical Yearbook, Russian Federal Statistics Service, 2010; author’s calculations and graphics. 
The trade statistics of the other two states illustrate different patterns in intra-union trade. 
For instance, Belarus was heavily reliant on trade with Russia in the run-up to the creation of 
the Customs Union: its exports of goods to Russia have ranged from between one-third and a 
half of its total trade volumes from 2004 to 2010 (see Figure 2). Therefore, Belarus had 
already exhibited a high intensity of transaction rates with Russia as its major trade partner.  
                                                     
14 Data taken from OEEC Statistical Bulletin, Series IV, 1956. 
15  Source: The Global Enabling Trade Report 2010. World Economic Forum (2010) 
(http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalEnablingTrade_Report_2010.pdf). 
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Figure 2. Dynamics of Belarus’ share of exports to Russia in total exports, 2004-2010 
 
Source: National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus (2012); authors’ calculations and graphics. 
Kazakhstan, however, demonstrated a different trade structure from those of Russia and 
Belarus. Kazakhstan appears to be more reliant on importing from Russia: the latter 
accounted for only 9% of its exports and for 45% of its imports at the time of establishing the 
CU. Trade flows between Belarus and Kazakhstan are rather weak: for instance, Astana 
imported only 1.5% of its total goods from Belarus in 2009, while its exports to Belarus were 
virtually non-existent.16 
The trends and figures above illustrate that the mutual trade in the CU was mainly 
aggregated by Russia, which had rather intense trade links with the two other members of 
the economic union, whereas Belarus and Kazakhstan had very limited trade flows in goods 
between them. The policies of the future EEU will have to account for this discrepancy. 
Given its declared objectives, the movement of other production factors will also be an 
important challenge for the EEU. The imbalances in the movement of capital prior to the 
establishment of the Customs Union were highlighted by Russia’s structure of foreign direct 
investments. For instance, Belarus accounted for about 41% of accumulated direct 
investment from Russia to CIS countries, while Kazakhstan only received 4.3% of the total.17 
Labour mobility is rather low between Russia and the other two member states, despite 
commonalities in culture and proficiency in Russian: for instance, only 5,500 people migrated 
from Belarus to Russia; about 2% of total influx of migrants in 2009, while Kazakh migrants 
(38,800 persons) accounted for 14% of the total influx.18 These figures, however, are quite 
comparable with low inter-state mobility at the early stages of the EEC’s formation, except 
for West Germany, which saw the influx of labour migrants from Italy in the post-war period 
(Fassmann and Munz, 1992); a trend that can be explained by structural factors. Russia, 
whose labour market is in need of qualified workers, faces tough competition from Western 
developed countries.19 
                                                     
16 According to the official Kazakh statistics retrieved from (http://www.stat.kz).  
17 Russia Federal Statistics Service (http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_13/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d5/23-
25.htm). 
18 Data retrieved from Demographic Yearbook of Russia (2010) 
(http://www.gks.ru/doc_2010/demo.pdf, p. 443). 
19 Released on 8 October 2012 (http://www.worldbank.org/ru/news/2012/10/08/russian-economic-
report-28). 
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The analysis of transaction rates between the prospective members of the EEU shows a very 
imbalanced pattern of regional trade integration. On the one hand, Belarus is heavily 
dependent on exports to Russia, with a marginal share of trade with Kazakhstan. On the 
other hand, Russia, and especially Kazakhstan, maintained a relatively low share of exported 
goods to other CU members. Coupled with rather slow dynamics for the movement of 
capital and labour force, these starting-points make the creation of a fully-fledged economic 
union within the Eurasian integration process more challenging than the one undertaken by 
the EEC countries, especially in view of the great ambition exhibited in the short timeframes 
foreseen for the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union. 
Overall, the relative size of the units composing the union and the distance between their 
economic centres present trickier background conditions for Eurasian economic integration 
than those shaping the European experience. The lower transaction rates (trade in goods) 
between member states are somewhat mitigated by the complementary trade structures. 
3.2 Formation conditions 
3.2.1 Implementation of common policies  
The history of European integration is a testament to the importance of convergence of 
member states’ interests at different stages of integration. This convergence will be even 
more salient for the Eurasian integration process, because so far it has been more reliant on 
initiatives and agreements between heads of state. The convergence of preferences in key 
policy areas (such as trade regulation) will therefore be a crucial factor in the progress of 
Eurasian economic integration. 
The estimates concerning the degree of economic integration attained so far differ greatly. 
On the one hand, Eurasian Economic Commission representatives claim that the CU has now 
reached a stage comparable to that of the EU in 1993.20 An official from the European 
Commission, however, opined that the current integration grouping represents only a 
“partial Customs Union”.21 In order to cut to the chase of the integration level, it is important 
to analyse recent developments against the proclaimed policy goals. Since the Treaty on 
Eurasian Economic Union (to be signed by 2015) is supposed to codify the existing 
provisions on the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space (according to Article 34 
of the Treaty on Eurasian Economic Commission), we base our analysis of the 
implementation of common policies on the goals stated in the treaties.  
The goals of the CU were determined in Article 2 of the 2007 Treaty on the Establishment of 
Customs Union as follows: 
“a) The common customs tariff and other measures regulating international trade 
with the third countries are defined and applied; 
b) The unified trade regime is established and applied in trade with the third 
countries; 
c) The procedure for charging and distributing customs duties and other dues, taxes 
and fees of equivalent effect is set and applied; 
d) The unified rules for determining the country of origin of goods are set and 
applied; 
                                                     
20 Tatyana Valovaya, Member of the Board of the Eurasian Economic Commission and Minister in 
charge of the development of integration and macroeconomics, in her speech at a CEPS event devoted 
to a discussion of the findings of this study, Brussels, 3 December 2012. 
21 Peter Balas, Deputy Director General, DG Trade, in his speech at the same CEPS event. 
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e) The unified rules for determining the customs value of goods are set and applied; 
f) The unified methodology for statistics of external and mutual trade is developed 
and applied; 
g) The unified order for customs regulation, including the unified rules for declaring 
goods and paying customs duties and the common customs regimes is set and 
applied; 
h) The bodies of the customs union are established and operate within the limits of 
their competence as authorised by the Parties.” 
These goals boil down to the two most important priorities: elimination of intra-bloc tariffs, 
establishing a common external tariff policy and the elimination of non-tariff barriers. There 
has been substantial progress in implementing the first two goals over the past five years; 
however, with several gaps remaining. 
3.2.1.1 Elimination of intra-bloc tariffs 
Within two years, the CU member states have accomplished the bulk of their primary tasks. 
First of all, quantitative restrictions have been eliminated within the Customs Union, thus 
mirroring the developments in the EEC in the 1960s. 
Secondly, the import duties between the CU member states were removed in 2010. This 
development is similar to the EEC practice: Article 13 of the Rome Treaty provided for a 
“progressive” abolishment of import duties between EEC member states. Customs duties 
between member states were eliminated by 1 July 1968. Formally speaking, it took the 
Customs Union of Eurasian Economic Community two years to attain the economic 
integration level that took the EEC a decade to achieve. However, such quantitative 
restrictions and intra-bloc tariffs are not the most stringent obstacles to trade, as the 
dynamics of intra-bloc trade are impeded by the proliferation of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to 
mutual trade.  
A stumbling block in the formation of the CES was the controversy over oil export duties. 
Contrary to Belarus’ claim in 2010 that the export duties on Russian oil and oil products 
should be eliminated within the Customs Union, Russia’s then Prime Minister Putin insisted 
that the duty could only be abolished after Belarus’ accession to the Common Economic 
Space (Yafimava, 2010). Export duties for Belarus were slashed in the intra-bloc trade in 
2012.22 In exchange Belarus yielded the right to levy the duties on oil exported from the 
territory of the Customs Union, thus favouring Russian exports. 
3.2.1.2 Common tariff policy 
The common external tariff (CET) was established in January 2010 as a major element of 
common tariff policy of the Customs Union. The CET is a set of customs tariff rates applied 
to imports from third countries into the common customs territory of Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. In this regard, the CU has mirrored the achievements of the common tariff 
policy of the European Economic Community, as set out in Article 9 of the Rome Treaty 
establishing a “common customs tariff in their relations with the third countries” and 
implemented by 1 July 1968. 
The introduction of CET partially affected the tariff rates in Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
Most tariff lines in the member states remained unchanged, as Russia and Belarus already 
                                                     
22 In particular, the export duty rates are quoted as “export duty rates for oil and some oil products 
exported from customs territory of Russia and other Customs Union members” in the Russian 
Government Decree of 22 September 2012, source: (http://www.rg.ru/2012/09/25/neft-dok.html). 
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had similar tariffs for about 70% of tariff lines. Apart from that, Kazakhstan had to increase 
its tariff rates for over 20% of tariff lines, while Russia and Belarus were bound to decrease 
tariff rates for about 25% of the tariff lines (EBRD, 2012). However, the formal introduction of 
the common external tariff (CET) coexists with exceptions in each member state,23 which are 
to be eliminated by 2015.  
Thus, the major challenges that the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union is currently 
facing are two-fold. On the one hand, it has yet to complete the formation of the Customs 
Union by eliminating existing exemptions for CET and harmonising tariffs. On the other 
hand, it has to coordinate these ‘tariff innovations’ with the commitments that Russia 
undertook as part of its accession to the World Trade Organization, which are bound to 
become a part of EEU legislation, according to the Treaties (see Box 1, below). In order to 
implement some of these commitments, the Commission revised the common external tariff 
for about 10% of product lines in August 2012,24 which entailed decreased import duties for 
cars, textile and food products, however, with little impact on duties for most manufactured 
goods. 
A number of other issues emerged in the process of establishing new tariff rates. For 
instance, in 2011 the Federal Customs Service filed a proposal25 to increase the duties for 
high-tech computer products to 10%, despite the fact that most such products are not 
produced in the domestic market. Such regulatory trends illustrate a tendency to ‘isolate’ the 
CU market from the global economy, which could harm local consumers in the CU countries. 
3.2.1.3 Eliminating non-tariff barriers 
The transition to the Common Economic Space poses the challenge of eliminating non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) to intra-bloc trade. The most crucial NTBs in the CES are inefficient customs 
procedures, poor infrastructure, inadequate institutions and regulations (EBRD, 2012).  
Research in the EU suggests that completion of the EU internal market in the early 1990s, 
which included the elimination of NTBs, had rather favourable effects on the EU’s external 
trade: it led to a significant increase in EU/EFTA trade in goods and produced welfare gains 
(Molle, 2000); effects on trade with developing countries were positive rather than negative 
(Koekkoek, 1990). Likewise, if more tangible benefits are to be expected from Eurasian 
integration, its member states have to vigorously pursue the elimination of non-tariff 
barriers, either through national legislation or through legally-binding decisions of the 
competent supranational institutions. 
(continued on page 13) 
                                                     
23 For instance, Kazakhstan was permitted to retain different tariffs for a range of tariff lines during the 
transition period, mainly railway transport, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, plastic and 
rubber. More information about the exemptions is available on the website of Eurasian Economic 
Commission (http://www.tsouz.ru/db/ettr/Pages/Perehodny2012.aspx) (Russian). 
24 Kommersant, 23 August 2012 (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2006988/print) (Russian). 
25  Source: Kommersant Daily, 16 August 2011 (http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1752689/print) 
(Russian). 
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Box 1. Russia’s WTO commitments impacting on the CU and CES policies 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the Customs Union in the framework of the Multilateral Trading 
System establishes the guidelines for compliance of the Customs Union legislation with WTO 
commitments. According to Article 1.1 of the Treaty, the commitments undertaken during any 
member state’s accession to the WTO become part of the Customs Union legislation, but the 
Party has to notify other Customs Union members of these provisions and coordinate the 
actions necessary for accession. The commitments undertaken by Russia will therefore 
become the integral part of the Eurasian Economic Union legislation. According to the WTO 
Accession Protocol, Russia’s commitments include: 
1) Gradual import tariff cuts for trade in goods: one-third of national tariff lines at the date 
of accession, one-quarter – within 3 years, the rest – within the next 7 years (cars and 
planes); 
2) Gradual liberalisation of trade in services: elimination of foreign equity limitation for 
telecoms (4 years after accession), access for foreign insurance companies (9 yrs), no 
equity cap for subsidiaries of foreign banks; 
3) Export duties on mineral fuels and oils to be “fixed”; 
4) Enhancing market access (by limiting non-tariff barriers):  
o elimination of quantitative restrictions on imports;  
o “equalisation” of railway transportation charges for exporters;  
o implementation of WTO rules into Russian laws and regulations for transit of 
goods. 
5) Obligation to join the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) within 4 years; 
6) All industrial subsidies to be eliminated and agricultural subsidies restricted; 
7) Producers and distributors of natural gas in Russia are to operate on “normal 
commercial considerations”, but regulation of prices for households is permitted; 
8) Technical barriers to trade (TBT):  
o Russian legislation to comply with WTO TBT Agreement; 
o Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures can be applied in the Customs Union 
only according to the WTO agreement; 
o Veterinary export certificates, different from CU standards, can be negotiated with 
exporters to Russia, if they request so; 
o Application of “international standards” for technical regulations; 
o Telecom equipment: regulations to be limited but consistent with CU and Eurasian 
Economic Community (EurAsEC) agreements; 
o List of products with obligatory certification in CU to be limited according to WTO 
TBT Agreement. 
9) Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs): 
o Implementation of WTO Agreement on TRIMs into Russian legislation; 
o Exception made for the existing automotive investment programs till 2018. 
10) Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights: 
o WTO Agreement on TRIPR to be fully applied, with no transitional period; 
o Berne Convention for Protection of Literary and Artistic Works to be applied. 
11) Annual reporting on Russia’s privatisation programme to the WTO; 
12) State price controls (on natural gas, gas transportation etc) to be published in media; 
13) Changes on Customs Union legislation have to be announced to the WTO prior to 
adoption, so that they could be commented upon to the “competent Customs Union 
body”. 
Source: World Trade Organisation (WTO), 10 November 2011. 
TOWARDS A EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: INTEGRATION AND COOPERATION | 13 
 
The experience of the European Economic Community illustrates that there are three major 
avenues of eliminating NTBs: 
1) regulatory competences of the European Commission since EEC creation. According to 
Article 10 of the Rome Treaty, the Commission obtained a right to “determine the 
methods of administrative co-operation [...], taking into account the need to reduce as 
much as possible formalities imposed on trade”, with a particular time constraint 
imposed on the implementation of the co-operation mechanism: “before the end of the 
first year after the entry into force of this Treaty”. 
2) specific rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the 1960-1970s; 
3) measures proposed in the Single European Act (1986). 
Since all these mechanisms put particular emphasis on the competences of supranational 
institutions in the elimination of NTBs to create a genuinely single market, we shall discuss 
their role in the Eurasian context in the next chapter. 
3.2.2 Supranational institutions 
In order to draw conclusions on the scope of further integration within the envisaged 
Eurasian Economic Union, we shall compare the competences of the supranational bodies 
(the Commission and the Court) in regulating the intra-bloc trade in goods in the CU/CES 
with those exerted by similar institutions in the EEC in 1960-1980s. 
3.2.2.1 The Eurasian Economic Commission 
According to Article 1 of the 2011 Treaty, the Eurasian Economic Commission is a 
“regulating body” ensuring the functioning and development of the Customs Union and the 
Common Economic Space. This broad statement does not, however, disclose the 
Commission’s exact competences in major policy areas, let alone delineate the inter-
institutional boundaries. For this reason, it is necessary to analyse the Commission’s 
functions and competences as stipulated by the Treaties in more detail. 
Functions 
According to Articles 6, 8 and 18 of the 2011 Treaty, the functional capacities of the Eurasian 
Economic Commission within the integration framework are much more limited than those 
enjoyed by the European Commission (set out in the Section 3 of Treaty of Rome). 
Table 4. Comparison of the functions of the Eurasian Commission and the European Commission 
Functions European Commission 
(according to the Treaty of Rome) 
Eurasian Economic Commission 
(according to the 2011 Treaty) 
Legislative • Adopt regulations, issue 
directives, take decisions, make 
recommendations or deliver 
opinions – shared with the 
Council (Art. 189) 
• Right to generate “proposals for 
economic integration” within CU & 
CES (Art. 1) and adopt CU technical 
regulations (directly applicable in the 
legal orders of the member states),  
decisions & recommendations (Art. 18) 
Executive • Monitor the application of 
legislation (Art. 155), in 
particular by using the 
infringement procedure before 
the Court (Art. 170) 
 
• Monitor implementation of legislation 
(Arts. 9, 18) and discretionary power 
to refer violations to the Court (Art. 
20) 
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Budgetary • Consolidate a preliminary “draft 
budget” (revenues & expenses); 
to submit to Council (Art. 203) 
• Implements the budget (Art. 205) 
• Designs and plans its own budget only 
(Art. 9 and 18) 
Representative • External representation 
• Negotiate trade agreements with 
third states in line with Council 
mandate (Art. 113(3)) 
• Manage representations in member 
states and third countries (Art. 18) 
 
This comparison of the functions attributed to the two Commissions allows us to make 
several conclusions about the institutional capacity of the Eurasian Economic Commission. 
First, the role of the Eurasian Economic Commission is clearly skewed towards the 
‘executive’ functions. On the one hand, its legally binding decisions enable it to create new 
(secondary) legislation; on the other hand, it is constrained by the Interstate Council’s 
decisions and existing legislation (Art. 3).  
Secondly, the executive role of the Eurasian Commission is rather diluted compared to its 
European prototype. According to Article 6 of the 2011 Treaty, the Eurasian Economic 
Commission is indeed responsible for implementing and monitoring compliance of the 
“international treaties that form the legal basis of the Customs Union and the Common 
Economic Space”, thus endowing it with an executive role. However, the actual mechanisms 
for such implementation and monitoring are rather weak, as discussed later in this section. 
In terms of its budgetary role, the powers of the Eurasian Economic Commission differ 
significantly from those attributed to the European Commission. On the one hand, the 
Eurasian Economic Commission has adopted a similar mechanism of forming its ‘own 
resources’ to that pioneered by the European Economic Community. Specifically, Article 7(3) 
of the Treaty establishes the sources of the Commission’s budget as the member states’ 
contributions proportional to the distribution of collected import duties. However, the 
powers of expenditure vested in the Commission have been curtailed: it can only outline the 
project of its own budget and implement it if approved by the Supreme Eurasian Economic 
Council. Interestingly though, the Treaty does not explicitly limit the Commission’s 
expenditure, and the very procedure of negotiating the volume of the budget by the Eurasian 
Economic Commission remains unclear. 
Last but not least, the representative functions of the Eurasian Economic Commission in 
trade policy are not strong enough to negotiate agreements with the third countries on behalf 
of the Customs Union. For instance, the Treaty points out that the Eurasian Economic 
Commission may be granted26 a right to sign international treaties within the scope of its 
competences; thus partially mirroring the European Commission’s mandate in external trade 
relations, but in a rather ‘trimmed’ fashion.  
Competences in major policy areas 
According to Article 3 of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Commission, the Commission 
operates within the areas of customs tariff and non-tariff regulation, as well as competition 
policy; areas in which the European Commission enjoys exclusive competence. However, the 
Eurasian Economic Commission has also been granted competence in a range of policy areas 
where the European Commission enjoys only shared competence, such as energy policy and 
transport. Besides, the Eurasian Economic Commission’s competences in macroeconomic 
                                                     
26 By the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council. 
TOWARDS A EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: INTEGRATION AND COOPERATION | 15 
 
policy and regulation of state monopolies appear particularly ambitious at this stage of 
economic integration. 
Conversely, the exercise of competences is significantly limited by the fact that the 
institutional architecture of the Eurasian Economic Union is in statu nascendi. Besides, some 
caveats contained in the 2011 Treaty may inhibit the Commission’s regulatory activity in key 
policy areas: competition and regulation of state monopolies. According to Article 6 of the 
Treaty, the Eurasian Economic Commission can request the authorities of member states to 
provide “information, necessary for carrying out its functions”, except for the “classified” 
information and data with “restricted dissemination” according to the law of a member state. 
It is unclear, however, how this caveat will be applied in practice. If the Eurasian Economic 
Commission, in pursuing its competition policy mandate, needs to request any information 
about Russian state-owned “strategic enterprises” it might be refused such data without the 
prior consent of Russian authorities, according to the Presidential Decree “On measures to 
defend the interests of Russian Federation in the foreign economic activity of Russian 
business entities” as of 11 September 2012. 27 Such conflicts of regulatory competence should 
be resolved in order to secure the efficient operation of the Eurasian Economic Commission 
within its mandate defined by the 2011 Treaty. 
Structure 
The structure of the Eurasian Commission’s Board is characterised by a longer chain of 
command than that of the European Commission. According to the 2011 Treaty, the 
Chairman of the Commission Board is tasked with organising the activity of the Board and 
liaising with the Commission’s Council and the Supreme Council (Article 23), while 
members of the Board “coordinate and control” the activities of their Departments (Article 
24). Thus, the Treaty effectively creates a ‘two-tier’ system cross-cutting the major policy 
areas: such as macroeconomic and competition policy. 
The Departments are chaired by Directors (Article 27) in a management structure similar to 
Directorates-General (DGs) in the European Commission, yet with a very different 
distribution of competences according to major policy areas: for instance, only the 
departments of Agriculture Policy, Competition Policy, Energy, Internal Market and 
Statistics have their ‘counterparts’ in the European Commission (DGs: AGRI, COMP, ENER, 
MARKT and Eurostat accordingly). Many departments reflect the current agenda of 
economic integration: for instance, the Department of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
and the Department of Customs Legislation and Implementation. 
Decision-making 
The 2011 Treaty lays the foundations for the decision-making mechanism in the Eurasian 
Economic Commission. The approach taken in regard to the Commission’s Council mirrors 
the ‘one member state – one commissioner’ rule of the EEC: Article 7 of the 2011 Treaty 
posits that every member of the Commission’s Council and the Commission’s Board has one 
vote; while Article 12 establishes that the decisions in the Commission’s Council are passed 
as a consensus. The Commission’s Board – as an ‘executive body’ of the Commission – 
(according to Article 14) includes three representatives from member states acting in an 
independent capacity (Article 15), each of whom is in charge of a particular department 
within the Commission. Board decisions can either be made unanimously or with a qualified 
majority vote, depending on the issues (Article 21). This hierarchical two-tier system with 
mixed decision-making procedures within the Commission is a clear break from the 
                                                     
27 Retrieved from (http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/16463) (Russian). See Riley (2012). 
16 | BLOCKMANS, KOSTANYAN & VOROBIOV 
 
European Commission precedent, and might significantly complicate the decision-making 
process in those policy areas that require independent and pro-active operation by the 
Eurasian Economic Commission, most notably non-tariff regulation and competition policy. 
The distribution of functions between the two Eurasian Economic Commission bodies 
remains rather vague in the 2011 Treaty: while the Commission’s Council is in charge of 
“general regulation of integration processes” in the CU and the CES (according to Article 8), 
the Commission’s Board is supposed to carry out implementation and monitoring 
compliance (Article 18) of the main policies. Further delineation of the functions in particular 
policy areas appears crucial for the efficiency of implementing essential policy objectives that 
pertain to the creation of an economic union. 
Monitoring compliance 
One of the most effective mechanisms of enforcing supranational regulation in the EEC has 
been for the European Commission to initiate proceedings for alleged breach of Community 
law. A similar procedure within the Eurasian Economic Community is set out in Article 20 of 
the Treaty: if a member state violates Treaty provisions or a Commission decision, then the 
Commission’s Board can make a decision (with two-thirds of the votes, currently requiring 
at least two member states) to “notify” the member state in question of the need to eliminate 
the violation within a “reasonable” period of time; if the latter fails to do so, the Board refers 
the issue to the Commission’s Council. Only if the member state ignores the Council’s 
decision can the Board refer the case to the EurAsEC Court (while notifying the 
Commission’s Council and the Supreme Council). The infringement procedure is further 
depicted in Figure 3 below.  
Figure 3. The infringement procedure initiated by the Eurasian Economic Commission 
 
Source: Provisions of the 2011 Treaty; authors’ graphics.  
In comparison to the EEC practice, member states in the CES effectively preserve more 
control over the infringement procedure, which could potentially decrease credible 
incentives to comply with the (legally binding) decisions of the Eurasian Economic 
Commission. Moreover, the question of possible penalties applied by the EurAsEC Court on 
member states that are found to be in breach also remains open in the Eurasian model of law 
enforcement. 
By way of conclusion, the competences and decision-making procedures of the Eurasian 
Economic Commission appear to be narrower than those seen in the European Commission. 
Firstly, its two-tier chain of command might significantly complicate and prolong the 
decision-making process. Secondly, its effective functions within the institutional integration 
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process are likely to be limited to monitoring and consulting, due to the apparent weakness 
of infringement procedures.  
3.2.2.2 The Court of Eurasian Economic Community 
Jurisdiction 
According to Art. 13(2) of the EurAsEC Court’s Statute (5 July 2010), the Court rules on 
disputes of an “economic nature that arise between Parties regarding the implementation of 
decisions of the EurAsEC institutions and treaty provisions in effect within the EurAsEC”.  
The Court interprets the treaty provisions when a) issuing rulings on specific cases; b) when 
receiving requests for clarification from Parties (Member States), “Higher courts of the 
Member States”, the Intergovernmental Council, the Parliamentary Assembly of EurAsEC, 
or the EurAsEC Integration Committee (Art. 13 (3) of the Court Statute). The latter resembles 
the preliminary rulings procedure before the European Court of Justice. According to Article 
3(1) of the Treaty on Application to the EurAsEC Court of the Economic Entities regarding disputes 
in the Customs Union, the “Higher Courts” of the member states can file a “request” with the 
Court to issue a “conclusion” on “applying international treaties of the Customs Union” and 
“acts of the Commission which affect the rights and interests of economic entities”, if these 
questions “significantly affect the resolution of the case”. 
According to Art. 13 (4) of the Statute, the Court rules on disputes in 3 cases: between the 
Commission and member states (infringement procedures and actions for failure to act), in 
inter-state complaints, and “in other cases” mentioned in the treaties (see below).  Pursuant 
to Article 2 of the Treaty on Application to the EurAsEC Court of the Economic Entities regarding 
disputes in the Customs Union, the Court hears cases on the Commission’s “acts” or their 
specific provisions (see the “Yuzhny Kuzbass vs The Commission” case mentioned below) 
and on disputed “actions” or “inaction” of the Commission. 
The “economic entities” that can file an application with the Court are listed in Article 1 of 
the Treaty: natural persons, but only if s/he is registered as an entrepreneur in one of the 
member states, and legal persons. The locus standi before the EurAsEC Court is thus more 
limited than before the European Court of Justice, where an open-ended group of natural 
persons can initiate proceedings, if only they can show that they are directly and 
individually concerned by acts adopted by the institutions. According to Article 14(2) of 
the Court’s Statute, only member states, official bodies of member states and business 
entities have standing before the EurAsEC Court.  
Case study 
The Court’s jurisdiction in intra-bloc disputes can be illustrated by its judgment of 5 
September 2012 in a suit filed by the public joint-stock company “Yuzhny Kuzbass”, a major 
coal supplier owned by Mechel Group, a vertically-integrated metallurgical company, against 
an act adopted by the Eurasian Economic Commission. The applicant disputed the provision 
of Article 1 of Commission Decision No. 335 “On issues pertaining to the functioning of the 
common customs territory and implementation of Customs Union mechanisms” (17 August 
2010), which stipulated a customs declaration for Group 27 goods exported from Russia 
(including coal). Following the 2011 decision of the Intergovernmental Council abolishing 
customs clearance of goods supplied between member states within the Customs Union 
since 1 July 2011, the company had stopped declaring its shipments of coal, but was fined by 
the Kemerovo Customs Administration (Russia). After having incurred financial losses, the 
company brought the case before the EurAsEC Court to resolve this conflict of norms. 
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The EurAsEC Court ruled in favour of the applicant and declared the provision of Article 1 
“incompliant” with CU legislation, based on the following arguments: 
• the Commission’s decisions are part of CU legislation; 
• the Commission can make non-binding “recommendations”, as well as binding 
decisions; 
• the Commission’s decisions cannot contain vague and ambiguous formulations of a 
“declaratory or informative” nature; 
• The provision of Article 1 of Commission Decision no. 335 “contradicts” the legal base, 
namely the 2007 Treaty creating the CU and the Customs Code, as well as “goals and 
principles” of establishing the CU and CES, including non-discrimination of Parties. 
Hence, the EurAsEC Court issued a ruling that repealed part of the Commission’s decision 
conforming to Russian law, thus (indirectly) prescribing the national authorities to apply the 
CU law over conflicting national rules. The Appeal Chamber upheld the Court’s ruling on 29 
November 2012, thus confirming the principle of primacy of CU/CES law over conflicting 
national law and relieving business entities (such as the Mechel Group) of the need to go 
through a cumbersome procedure of customs declaration. The Court thereby effectively 
eliminated one of the non-tariff barriers to intra-bloc trade. 
Principles of Direct Effect and Supremacy 
The ruling of the EurAsEC Court in the Yuzhny Kuzbass-case bears similarities to the ground-
breaking judgments of the European Court of Justice in case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos vs. 
Netherlands Internal Revenue Administration (finding that Article 12 of the EEC Treaty 
“produces direct effects and creates individual rights which national courts must protect”)28 
and in case 6/64 Costa vs. ENEL (in which it established the principle of “supremacy” of 
Community law over conflicting national law of a member state).29 As such, the ECJ was 
instrumental in creating an autonomous legal order for the EEC, supreme to the national law 
of the member states and characterised by the potential for vigilant individuals to invoke its 
rights and obligations directly before a national judge. The EurAsEC Court in Minsk could 
play a similar role in consolidating the Eurasian economic integration process, provided that 
the implementation of its rulings are not impeded by national authorities in the member 
states. It therefore remains to be seen whether the Russian authorities will indeed take the 
necessary measures to comply with the EurAsEC Court’s first landmark judgment. 
Dispute resolution between member states 
Another important issue is the role of the Court in resolving disputes between the member 
states. Although rather rarely, the European Court of Justice has seen cases brought by 
member states against other member states. To compare, the EurAsEC Court has a secondary 
role in resolving inter-state disputes. According to Article 34 of the 2011 Treaty on the 
Eurasian Economic Commission, such disputes regarding the interpretation and 
implementation of the Treaty are resolved first through “consultations and negotiations 
between the Parties involved”. The case can be referred to the Court only if consensus has 
not been reached within six months. This caveat might therefore significantly slow down the 
dispute-resolution process, should a particularly contentious yet urgent issue arise.  
                                                     
28 Judgment of the Court, Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, ECR 1963, p. 1. 
29 Judgment of the Court, Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, ECR 1964, p. 585. 
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To conclude, the EurAsEC Court has the potential to eliminate non-tariff barriers within the 
Customs Union by ruling in the crucial cases that reveal conflicts between CU law and 
national laws. Given that the incorporation of EEU law is likely to linger until 2015, the Court 
decisions might plug the legal gaps that pose evident obstacles to trade agents in the member 
states. 
3.3 Process conditions 
Estimates of the effects of the CU on the member states’ economies and political systems 
made in the academic and policy-oriented literature have differed markedly so far. On the 
one hand, CIS-based economists forecast an additional 2.5% growth to aggregate GDP for the 
members of the CU and the CES by 2030 (Ivanter et al., 2012). Other analysts are more critical 
about the long-term effects of the Customs Union. According to Vinhas de Souza (2011), the 
EurAsEC Customs Union is a GDP-reducing framework, “wherein the negative trade-
diversion effects clearly overwhelm any positive trade-creation effects” and therefore the 
external trade positions of all member states worsen. After having analysed three possible 
integration scenarios, de Souza claims that these adverse effects can be mitigated only by full 
harmonisation of the energy sectors of the participating countries. Furthermore, Anders 
Aslund points out30 that the “Eurasian Union” is unlikely to bring about economic and 
political integration and will lead to “Russia's isolation with Belarus and Kazakhstan at great 
cost to the Kremlin”.  
Given these differing assessments of the political and macroeconomic effects of the Eurasian 
integration process, it is important to take stock of both the institution-building process and 
the actual dynamics of the economic development within this grouping over the past three 
years. Therefore, in this section we analyse whether the Eurasian integration process has 
furthered a more integrated governance mode in the political realm and intensified economic 
cooperation between the member states, as initially intended by the creation of the Customs 
Union and the Common Economic Space.  
3.3.1 Decision-making mode 
Having analysed the role of the nascent supranational bodies of the Customs Union and 
Common Economic Space in the previous section, we uncovered a number of pitfalls for the 
efficiency of their functioning. Arguably, unlike the early years of European economic 
integration, which was spurred by the neo-functionalist extension of the supranational 
institutions’ competences to new policy areas, Eurasian integration is mainly based on and 
guided by the intergovernmental mode of governance. 
Despite the establishment of the supranational Eurasian Economic Commission, the 
decision-making process within the CU and the CES leans towards the intergovernmental 
model with the member states’ governments holding substantial decision-making powers. 
This is in contrast to the EEC, which had stronger supranational characteristics. The member 
states of the CU and the CES participate in the work of the Eurasian Economic Commission, 
both in the early stages of policy shaping through the consultative bodies of the Commission 
and in the decision-making process through the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council (see 
Figure 4, below). 
                                                     
30 See A. Aslund (2012).  
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Figure 4. The decision-making process in the CU and the CES 
 
Source: Official website of the Eurasian Economic Commission (http://www.tsouz.ru).  
The Supreme Eurasian Economic Council is the highest body within the Customs Union 
and the Common Economic Space. In terms of structure, it comprises the heads of state or 
government. Importantly, it defines the strategy and the objectives of the further 
development of the CU and the CES, thus retaining its grip over the integration process. It 
also decides on the areas of the Commission’s operation within the powers conferred by the 
CU and the CES treaties. 
The Supreme Eurasian Economic Council approves the procedures that the Commission has 
to follow as well as the budget, staff and departments. The Council also decides on opening 
Commission missions in the member states, in third countries and in international 
organisations. The Supreme Eurasian Economic Council may grant the Commission the right 
to sign international treaties and agreements on matters within the competence of the 
Commission that are also subject to the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council’s ratification. In 
comparison, the Council of Ministers – the main decision-making body in the EEC – had less 
power over the Commission than the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council has over the 
Eurasian Economic Commission. Overall, the decision-making rules in the EEC were more 
favourable for the supranational mode of governance, with the Commission exerting more 
treaty-based competences and policy implementation powers. 
The Eurasian Economic Commission’s consulting bodies are composed of seconded national 
experts in order to facilitate communication with the member states and participation in the 
work of the Commission. They are responsible for ensuring that member states’ interests are 
taken on board by the Commission. By contrast, the consultative bodies of the High 
Authority had merely an advisory function and consisted of producers, interest groups and 
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workers. As analysed in the previous section, the ECJ had a larger mandate than the 
EurAsEC Court of Justice. 
Table 5. Comparison of the decision-making structures in the CU/CES and the EEC 
Bodies EEC CU and CES 
Principle 
decision-making 
body 
The Council of Ministers is the 
principle decision-making body. 
Decides by unanimity, qualified 
majority or simple majority vote. 
The Supreme Eurasian Economic 
Council holds the right to approve the 
procedures, budget, staff and 
departments of the Commission. 
Decision-making mode is unanimity. 
Commission The Commission has a right of 
initiative, some decision-making and 
implementation powers. Guardian of 
the treaties. 
The Commission has the right to 
make decisions and recommendations 
but submits proposals on the main 
directions of integration for the 
approval to the Supreme Eurasian 
Economic Council. Guardian of the 
treaties. 
Consulting bodies Consultative Committee comprising 
producers and interest groups with 
purely advisory function (e.g. ECSC 
Treaty, Economic and Social 
Committee). 
Facilitates communication between 
the member states and the 
Commission to ensure that member 
states’ priorities are reflected in the 
Commission’s proposals. 
Parliament Assembly to provide democratic 
input with an advisory role (later 
directly elected. 
No role. 
Court Ensures the proper interpretation and 
application of the Treaty and 
secondary legislation. 
Ensures the proper interpretation and 
application of CU law. Natural 
persons have limited locus standi. 
 
The lack of a parliamentary dimension in the Eurasian integration process can be viewed 
from two perspectives. As outside observers point out, its absence deprives the Eurasian 
economic integration process and institutions of democratic accountability, despite the fact 
that rules and decisions impact on consumers and businesses in member states. On the other 
hand, representatives of the Eurasian Economic Commission point out that this is a 
temporary lacuna bound to be filled in the near future, as “national parliaments are fighting 
for their place” in the institutional set-up of the CU and CES.31 The sheer involvement of 
national parliaments is not likely, however, to drastically change the decision-making mode, 
unless they obtain blocking or co-decision powers vis-à-vis the Commission and the 
Supreme Council. There are signs that a consultation process is underway in the business 
community of the three countries. As a representative of the Russian Union of Industrialists 
and Entrepreneurs pointed out,32 business associations of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
signed an agreement to launch a “Business Dialogue” in October 2010, followed by a 
Consultative Council linking the Commission with business representatives. This 
development could be compared to the establishment of the European Economic and Social 
Committee in 1958; however, the CU structures currently seem to lack representation of 
employees.  
                                                     
31 Tatyana Valovaya’s remark at the CEPS event on 3 December 2012. 
32  Oleg Preksin, Managing Director for International Cooperation of the Russian Union of 
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, in his speech at the CEPS event on 3 December 2012. 
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Despite the innovations brought about by the Eurasian Economic Commission’s newly 
acquired competences and the first EurAsEC Court ruling, the decision-making process in 
the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space is based on intergovernmentalism. 
Thus, the implementation of the key policies envisaged in the Eurasian Economic Union is 
likely to be carried out at the intergovernmental rather than the supranational level of 
governance. 
3.3.2 Economic effects of Eurasian integration 
As scholars of international trade (Viner, 1950; Molle, 1990) point out, the introduction of a 
customs union may cause trade creation and trade diversion effects. In order to evaluate 
such effects in the CU and CES, we analyse the dynamics and the structure of intra-union 
trade volumes based on the available data in the 2010-2012 time period.33 This analysis is 
geared towards a conclusion on the level of Eurasian trade integration that has been 
achieved so far, 34  particularly in comparison with the European Economic Community 
developments in the comparable time period. 
Before analysing the preliminary effects of Eurasian integration, it is opportune to take stock 
of the developments that took place in the early stages of the European integration process. 
According to existing research, the EEC’s creation had a number of positive effects on the 
economies of the member states, yet adverse effects on their global economic links. 
1. Trade creation: the volumes of trade between EEC member states have increased 
significantly over the years, facilitated by the economies of scale in the EEC intra-
industry trade (Moore, 1994). This development suggests that European integration 
was conducive to the expansion of markets for large industrial producers inside the 
EEC. Notably, positive trade creation effects were most prominent in sectors such as 
machinery, transport and fuels, thus reflecting growing specialisation across industries.  
2. Trade diversion for manufactured products: evidence suggests that a substantial share 
of imports from countries outside the EEC was replaced by imports from other EEC 
members (Balassa, 1974). This trend implies an increasing ‘isolationism’ of the EEC 
member states from external suppliers and markets, which creates obstacles to the 
global liberalisation of trade. Trade diversion has affected sectors such as food and 
chemicals. 
3. Long-term economic growth: research shows that EEC members increased their 
growth rates by 0.6-0.8% a year (Henrekson et al., 1997), as a result of their economic 
integration. 
These overall positive effects of early European integration could serve as a useful 
benchmark for evaluating the possible economic effects of Eurasian economic integration 
and highlighting potential benefits and pitfalls in the process.  
To begin with, official sources report rather positive trends in Customs Union trade. 
According to the statistics published by the Eurasian Economic Commission, mutual trade 
volumes within the Customs Union grew on a year-on-year basis by 29% in 2010, 34.6% in 
                                                     
33 Only the data from January to August 2012 were supplied by member states’ statistical services so 
far; we thus present the data on a quarterly basis, i.e. for the first two quarters. 
34 Representatives of the Eurasian Economic Commission point out that progress of the integration 
grouping is illustrated by the consistent growth of intra-union trade. According to Tatyana Valovaya, 
volumes of intra-union trade have almost doubled since the Customs Union was established. 
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201135 and 13.5% in the first half of 2012,36 thus underpinning a rather strong trend of intra-
bloc trade increase over a 2.5 year period. However, despite the seemingly positive general 
trend, these data on total trade volumes do not allow us to discern the trade effects of the 
Customs Union in sectors with higher added value, such as metallurgy, machinery and 
equipment. For that reason, a deeper analysis of bilateral sectoral trade between the CU 
member states is required to make a tentative conclusion on whether the initial integration 
managed to encourage trade flows in the sectors most susceptible to trade liberalisation 
within the CU and the CES. 
In order to gauge the effects of Eurasian integration in this section, we shall analyse the 
following outcome-based indicators:  
1) the dynamics of intra-union trade volumes in the most important sectors, which could 
help highlight possible trade creation effects; 
2) the change in the share of imports of manufactured goods by CU member states in 
total imports in comparison to other major trade partners, which could serve as an 
indicator of possible trade diversion patterns in Eurasian integration; 
3) other effects of integration measured in terms of investment flows and migration 
changes. 
Such an analysis presents us with two inter-related methodological challenges:  
• Defining the time limits of the analysis. The elimination of customs borders and tariffs 
between CU member states, which occurred in 2010, would (in theory) serve as a 
strong impetus for increasing intra-bloc trade flows. However, in practice, a certain 
time lag would be expected in the activity of foreign trade agents.  
• Accounting for the exogenous factors. An inevitable question one would have to ask 
is: how do we separate the effects of the CU implementation from the effects of 
economic recovery in the wake of the global financial crisis? For instance, regression 
analysis undertaken by the EBRD shows that “changes in volumes of imports between 
2009 and 2010 were largely driven by trade recovery effects”.37 We therefore take into 
account the effect of global conjuncture on the change in intra-bloc trade volumes in 
2010, alongside possible CU-induced trade creation effects.  
For these reasons, we will limit our analysis to the period 2010-2012, with a breakdown by 
quarters to allow for the factors influencing trade flows (seasonality of demand, global 
trends, etc). The analysis of trade flows will focus on two sectors that appear particularly 
affected by the introduction of the Customs Union as they have substantial export volumes 
both within and outside the integration grouping: ferrous metals, and machinery and 
equipment. 
3.3.2.1 Trade creation effects 
A sectoral analysis of the trade flows dynamics shows a very modest increase in intra-Union 
trade within two years of the Customs Union operation. For instance, Russia’s exports of 
ferrous metals, which constitute its most important export product group after oil and gas, 
                                                     
35 Volumes of mutual trade in 2010-2011, Eurasian Economic Commission 
(http://www.tsouz.ru/db/stat/iCU201112new/Documents/IALL201112_2.pdf). 
36 Volumes of mutual trade in 2010-2011, Eurasian Economic Commission 
(http://www.tsouz.ru/db/stat/iCU201208/Documents/IALL201208_2.pdf). 
37 EBRD (2012), p. 69. 
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demonstrate a very ambiguous trend (see Figure 5). After initial growth in the first two 
quarters of 2010 (which can be attributed to post-crisis recovery), Russia’s exports to the 
EurAsEC remained quite stable for a year. The export volumes did pick up substantially in 
2011 (mainly due to the increase in demand for steel products on global markets, as a sharper 
export increase to the EU in the same period would suggest), only to decline in the first half 
of 2012, which might be an indication of seasonal factors in demand. This development leads 
us to assume that Russia’s export of ferrous metals could have been initially encouraged by 
the improvement of trade conditions within the CU, yet failed to have a sustainable effect, 
with Russia’s exports to its member countries returning to the pre-2010 levels in mid-2012. 
Figure 5. Dynamics of Russia’s exports of ferrous metals to major markets, thousand $US 
 
Sources: Russia’s Federal Customs Service data; authors’ graphics. 
A similar trend is observed in Russia’s export of finished goods. As Figure 6 illustrates, the 
first three quarters of 2010 saw a two-fold increase in Russia’s exports of machinery and 
equipment, largely due to the post-crisis recovery of demand. However, in the last two years 
Russian exports of these products have fluctuated and ultimately declined to the (roughly) 
pre-Customs Union level.  
Figure 6. Dynamics of Russia’s exports of machinery and equipment to major markets, thousand $US 
 
 Sources: Russia’s Federal Customs Service data; authors’ graphics. 
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As the data above show, changes in export volumes to EurAsEC markets were mostly 
consistent with fluctuation in exports to the EU, apart from the stable volumes of exports at 
the end of 2011, while supplies to the EU saw a sharp decrease. This latter ‘divergence’ might 
indeed suggest the improvement of Russian suppliers’ trade terms in the EurAsEC due to 
the Customs Union. However, this support seems to have been rather short-lived, as Russia’s 
exports of machinery and equipment to EurAsEC countries returned to the same level as 
exports to the EU in mid-2012, despite prior elimination of tariff barriers with Belarus and 
Kazakhstan within the Customs Union. 
Overall, these volatile dynamics in major export-oriented sectors of Russia’s economy fail to 
supply strong evidence for the sustainable trade-creation effects of the introduction of the 
Customs Union. This development is rather different from the strong trade creation effects in 
these industries seen in the early stages of European integration. On the one hand, the 
increase in 2011 could indeed have been aided by the elimination of trade barriers. On the 
other hand, initial trade creation effects appear rather precarious in the short run, illustrated 
by the slump in 2012. We therefore conclude that integration steps beyond tariff policy are 
needed to boost intra-bloc trade in the key sectors. 
3.3.2.2 Trade diversion effects 
The dynamics of imports to member states help to estimate possible trade diversion effects in 
the Customs Union. In order to ascertain how the share of imports of manufactured products 
from EurAsEC countries changed in comparison to imports from major suppliers (the EU 
and APEC countries), we analyse the change in Russia’s38 import structures for the period 
under review. Interestingly, the EurAsEC share of machinery and equipment imports to 
Russia increased at the beginning of 2011 (Figure 7), while imports from other suppliers 
shrank. However, the share of EurAsEC did not exceed 6% in mid-2012 (see Table 6), thus 
remaining a rather minor line in Russia’s imports. 
Figure 7. Dynamics of Russia’s imports of machinery and equipment from EurAsEC, thousand $US 
 
Sources: Russia’s Federal Customs Service data; authors’ graphics. 
                                                     
38 As the biggest market in the bloc. 
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Table 6. Share of Russia’s imports of machinery from EurAsEC in comparison to major suppliers 
Q1 2010 Q2 2010 Q3 2010 Q4 2010 Q1 2011 Q2 2011 Q3 2011 Q4 2011 Q1 2012 Q2 2012 
APEC 43% 45% 45% 44% 43% 39% 43% 43% 43% 43% 
EurAsEC 4.8% 4.5% 3.9% 3.3% 4.5% 4.5% 3.4% 4.0% 5.8% 3.3% 
EU 43% 42% 43% 45% 43% 47% 44% 45% 42% 45% 
Sources: Russia’s Federal Customs Service data; authors’ graphics. 
As Table 6 illustrates, APEC and EU suppliers managed to preserve their share of imports to 
Russia, despite the more discriminatory terms of the newly created Customs Union.  
In contrast to the early EEC developments (spurred mainly by the onset of the Common 
Agriculture Policy), the introduction of the Customs Union and the Common Economic 
Space appears not to have caused trade-diverting effects in the most important food sectors 
of the member states. For instance, the share of Russian imports of meat products from the 
EU not only remained stable in 2011, it also managed to increase substantially in the first 
quarters of 2012 (see Figure 8 below), while the share of EurAsEC suppliers decreased. 
Figure 8. Shares of meat products imported from EurAsEC countries and the EU, 2010-2012 
 
Sources: Russia’s Federal Customs Service data; authors’ graphics. 
Thus, in line with EEC experience, the trade diversion effects in the sector of machinery and 
equipment have not been prominent in the CU so far, which can be attributed to rather 
uncompetitive domestic producers. However, unlike the European experience of building an 
agricultural ‘fortress’, food imports (in particular, meat products) from external suppliers 
were not replaced by intra-Union producers. This trend might be attributed to the poor 
competitiveness of its agricultural producers and comparatively minor changes to industry 
regulations brought about by the Customs Union. 
3.3.2.3 Effects on the trade structures of member states 
Finally, a word on the impact of the customs union on the foreign trade structures of the 
member states is warranted. In Section 1, we stated that one of the possible economic 
motivations for Russia to embark on the Eurasian integration project was the potential to 
increase the exports of manufactured products and thus help diversify its economy away 
from raw material export dependency (mostly oil and gas). On the one hand, the share of 
Russia’s intra-regional exports increased in the wake of the creation of the Customs Union 
(see Figure 9, below). 
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Figure 9. Comparison of Russia’s export structure in machinery and equipment from 2010 to 2011 
         
 
However, Russia’s export structure in machinery and equipment has not managed to sustain 
these gains in the longer run: Russia’s share of manufactured goods exported to EurAsEC 
rebounded to 16% in mid-2012 (see Figure 10). Despite more favourable conditions 
introduced by the Customs Union, its export share to EurAsEC markets has in fact decreased 
over the past two years (compared to early 2010). 
Figure 10. Structure of Russia’s exports of machinery and equipment in mid-2012 
 
Sources: Russia’s Federal Customs Service data; authors’ graphics. 
Furthermore, the share of Belarus’ total exports to CU members has been declining for 2.5 
years since the CU was established: not only did Belarus fail to increase its modest share of 
trade with Kazakhstan; it also saw a dramatic decrease in its total export share to Russia, its 
main trade partner (see Figure 11 below). Contrary to what one would expect from CU 
implementation, its share of exports to Russia decreased by 8% by mid-2012. 
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Figure 11. The dynamics of the share of Belarus’ exports to other CU members, 2008-2012 
 
Source: Belstat (National Statistical Committee of Belarus), 2012. 
Despite treating the year 2010 as a ‘post-crisis anomaly’, this counter-intuitive trend of 
Belarus’ falling share of exports in manufacturing to Russia during 2011-2012 raises further 
questions about the potential of export increase for Belarusian producers in the Customs 
Union. It therefore casts doubt on the improvement of Belarus’ terms of trade in 
manufactured products following the launch of the Common Economic Space. 
To sum up, the EurAsEC Customs Union appears to have had a two-pronged impact on the 
structure of its member states’ foreign trade in crucial sectors (ferrous metals, machinery and 
equipment). On the one hand, Russia (like more export-oriented countries in terms of 
manufactured goods) did indeed increase its intra-Union trade in 2011, amid the CU 
implementation. On the other hand, the dwindling share of CU-bound exports from Belarus, 
as well as Russia’s ‘rebound’ in 2012, lead us to believe that the short-term effects of the 
introduction of the Customs Union are over, and that its member states will need to 
introduce new policy measures to sustain intra-bloc trade growth.   
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4. Conclusions and recommendations 
The major challenges facing the Eurasian Economic Union are: 
1. Eliminating non-tariff barriers in intra-bloc trade, especially those stemming from 
customs clearance procedures, transport infrastructure (due to large distances between 
economic centres) and business regulation (due to differing regimes in Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan). The underlying question that remains is: will these goals be achieved 
by attributing more competences for the Commission and the Court or by using the 
national mechanisms in the member states? On the one hand, the establishment of 
“competing jurisdictions” for businesses, highlighted by the representatives of the 
Eurasian Economic Commission, is supposed to facilitate intra-bloc trade and 
investments. On the other hand, this regulatory competition will have to be paralleled 
by the alleged “coordination” of a number of policies in a very limited period of time 
(by 2015).  
2. Harmonising its tariff and non-tariff regulations with Russia’s WTO commitments, and 
possibly commitments arising from Kazakhstan’s anticipated accession.  These external 
commitments are accounted for by the Eurasian Economic Commission through the 
regular process of tariff revision; however, the changes to crucial non-tariff barriers 
(such as the introduction of the automobile recycling fee, criticised by the European 
Commission) need to be reversed.39 
3. Agreeing on the negotiation framework for external relations. According to CU  
officials,40 the Eurasian Economic Commission now holds a mandate on negotiating 
trade agreements with the EU on behalf of its member states, most importantly, Russia. 
At the moment, this move is resisted by the European Commission, which is of the 
opinion that the conditions for an EU-CU agreement are not in place, due to the fact 
that the Eurasian Customs Union is not WTO-consistent.41 Obstacles to the CU’s full 
compatibility with WTO criteria need to be urgently and properly addressed if the CU 
intends to be recognised as a negotiating party by its major trading partners. 
The Eurasian Economic Commission and member states can mitigate these challenges in a 
number of ways, in particular by: 
1) Tracking down the progress of eliminating trade restrictions within the Customs Union 
and making the monitoring conclusions available to the WTO members (the Commission 
Board); 
2) Announcing the likely rates of import tariffs after the implementation of Russia’s WTO 
commitments and Kazakhstan’s adoption of the Customs Union’s CET; explicitly 
outlining and communicating the timeline of WTO-agreed changes in non-tariff 
barriers (Customs Tariff and Non-Tariff Regulation Department); 
3) Explaining the main provisions of the future Treaty on Eurasian Economic Union 
pertaining to external trade and communicating it to the WTO partners (Integration 
Development Department). 
                                                     
39 See the speech by Karel De Gucht, European Commissioner for Trade, “After WTO Accession: 
Reform and EU-Russia Trade Relations”, ALDE Seminar of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for 
Europe, Brussels, 5 December 2012. 
40 Tatyana Valovaya, at the CEPS event on 3 December 2012. 
41 Peter Balas, at the same event. 
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Having adopted the framework of Haas & Schmitter (1964), we evaluated the main 
indicators of the envisaged economic union at different stages based on the scale of ‘low’ to 
‘high’. Comparative estimates of the viability of economic union formation are aggregated in 
the table below.  
Table 7. Conditions underpinning successful implementation of economic unions (Haas & Schmitter) 
Conditions Indicators to 
operationalise 
Measurement 
Scale 
EEC CU 
Background conditions (EEC: 1957, CU – prior to 2010) 
1. Size of units Population of member 
states, GDP volumes 
Homogeneity: 
low to high 
Medium: 3 big + 
3 small MS 
Medium: 1 big 
+2 small MS 
2. Distance among 
economic centres 
Minimum road 
distance between 
major trading cities 
Long distance 
low potential 
and vice versa 
Medium Low 
3. Initial Rate of 
Transactions 
reliance on intra-
union trade: share of 
regional exports in 
overall foreign trade 
< 10%: low 
10-50%: 
medium 
> 50%: high 
Medium to 
High 
Medium42, but 
lower than 
EEC 
Formation Conditions  
4. Implementation 
of Common 
Trade Policies43 
-eliminating intra-bloc 
duties  
-implementing 
common customs 
policy  
Implemented: 
high; 
Lacking: low 
High 
(completed in 
1968) 
Medium: 
- tensions over 
oil export duty 
- lingering CET 
exemptions 
5. Powers of the 
Union 
Impact of the 
supranational bodies: 
1) competence of the 
Commission; 
2) direct application of 
Court decisions 
If the bodies 
can change 
outcomes in 
major policy 
areas: high, if 
not: low 
High Low: 
- weak role in 
infringement 
procedure 
- Court rulings 
to be applied 
Process Conditions (EEC: 1957-1968, CU: 2010-2012) 
6. Decision-Making 
procedure 
Prevailing governance 
mode applied in the 
union 
Intergovern-
mental – low; 
Supranational 
– high 
High 
Mixed with 
strong supra-
national bodies 
Medium  
Mixed with 
strong inter-
governmental 
features 
7. Outcome-based 
Transactions 
Interdependence: 
trade dynamics and 
structure changes 
Grows –high; 
does not 
change -low 
High Medium 
-growth in2011 
-stagnates 2012 
Level of Economic 
Integration 
High or Low  High Medium 
Level of Institutional 
Integration 
High or Low  High Low 
                                                     
42 In part, due to the already existing free trade area within the CIS (but FTA had existed prior to the 
EEC as well: e.g. Benelux). 
43 We have changed this indicator from ‘governmental purposes’ in Haas & Schmitter to account for 
the more significant role of government leaders in the Eurasian context. 
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